For weeks, the US and Israel have insisted that Iran's military capacity has been severely degraded. US President Donald Trump and his defense secretary, Pete Hegseth, have repeatedly claimed that sustained strikes have crippled Iran's command structure and weakened its ability to respond. By their account, the conflict should already be moving towards an end.
Yet the opposite appears to be happening. The escalation continues faster, sharper, and with fewer clear exit points. It emerged on Saturday that Iran had launched two missiles towards the US-UK base on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, a distance of around 3,800km (2,300 miles). Although the missiles did not reach the island, the incident has raised fresh concerns about Iran's capabilities.
Whether this reflects a previously undisclosed capability or one developed under bombardment, the implication is the same: military pressure has not halted Iran's progress. If much of its leadership has indeed been eliminated, including the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, senior figures such as Ali Larijani, commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC), and key missile manufacturing sites destroyed, then who is directing this campaign, and how has Iran managed to sustain its capabilities under such pressure?
The uncertainty begins at the very top. Mojtaba Khamenei, who reportedly survived the strike that killed his father and several close family members, has since been named as the new leader. Yet he has not appeared in public. Beyond two written messages, nothing has been seen or heard from him. His condition remains unclear, and so does his ability to lead. In a system built on central authority, this silence creates uncertainty at the very centre of power.
And yet, Iranian actions suggest anything but collapse. On Saturday, Iran also struck the town of Dimona in Israel's Negev desert, an area linked to Israel's undeclared nuclear programme. That followed Israeli strikes on Iran's energy infrastructure near Bushehr, which also hosts Iran's nuclear power plant. The message was simple: escalation will be matched, and key sites are no longer off limits.
These actions suggest coordination rather than confusion. The assumption behind US and Israeli strategy, that removing top leaders would lead to paralysis, now appears uncertain. The idea of 'shock and awe' depends on decision-making structures collapsing quickly. But what if those structures are more resilient than expected?
If that is the case, then a more immediate problem emerges: who is left to negotiate with? Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has kept a low profile. Early in the conflict, he apologized to neighbouring countries affected by Iranian strikes, a move that reportedly angered elements within the IRGC. Since Mojtaba Khamenei's rise, he has said little, further narrowing diplomatic options.
But it's not just Iran that can escalate the conflict; Trump also raised the stakes on Saturday night. He issued a 48-hour ultimatum demanding that Iran reopen the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world's busiest oil routes, warning that failure to comply would lead to the US 'obliterating' Iranian power plants. Iran rejected the demand and responded with a similar threat: any attack on its energy infrastructure would be met with strikes across the region.
This exchange highlights the risks ahead. Trump is moving quickly in a direction that leaves fewer options. Without troops on the ground, the United States and Israel can only strike from the air, causing damage but not necessarily achieving the goal of total surrender. At the same time, such strikes could trigger wider retaliation, without reopening Hormuz.
The conflict's escalation has reduced not only strategic options but also potential paths toward resolution. With limited channels for negotiation, both Iran and the US face increasingly dire consequences, risking a cycle of destruction with severe repercussions for millions in the region.
Yet the opposite appears to be happening. The escalation continues faster, sharper, and with fewer clear exit points. It emerged on Saturday that Iran had launched two missiles towards the US-UK base on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, a distance of around 3,800km (2,300 miles). Although the missiles did not reach the island, the incident has raised fresh concerns about Iran's capabilities.
Whether this reflects a previously undisclosed capability or one developed under bombardment, the implication is the same: military pressure has not halted Iran's progress. If much of its leadership has indeed been eliminated, including the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, senior figures such as Ali Larijani, commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC), and key missile manufacturing sites destroyed, then who is directing this campaign, and how has Iran managed to sustain its capabilities under such pressure?
The uncertainty begins at the very top. Mojtaba Khamenei, who reportedly survived the strike that killed his father and several close family members, has since been named as the new leader. Yet he has not appeared in public. Beyond two written messages, nothing has been seen or heard from him. His condition remains unclear, and so does his ability to lead. In a system built on central authority, this silence creates uncertainty at the very centre of power.
And yet, Iranian actions suggest anything but collapse. On Saturday, Iran also struck the town of Dimona in Israel's Negev desert, an area linked to Israel's undeclared nuclear programme. That followed Israeli strikes on Iran's energy infrastructure near Bushehr, which also hosts Iran's nuclear power plant. The message was simple: escalation will be matched, and key sites are no longer off limits.
These actions suggest coordination rather than confusion. The assumption behind US and Israeli strategy, that removing top leaders would lead to paralysis, now appears uncertain. The idea of 'shock and awe' depends on decision-making structures collapsing quickly. But what if those structures are more resilient than expected?
If that is the case, then a more immediate problem emerges: who is left to negotiate with? Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has kept a low profile. Early in the conflict, he apologized to neighbouring countries affected by Iranian strikes, a move that reportedly angered elements within the IRGC. Since Mojtaba Khamenei's rise, he has said little, further narrowing diplomatic options.
But it's not just Iran that can escalate the conflict; Trump also raised the stakes on Saturday night. He issued a 48-hour ultimatum demanding that Iran reopen the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world's busiest oil routes, warning that failure to comply would lead to the US 'obliterating' Iranian power plants. Iran rejected the demand and responded with a similar threat: any attack on its energy infrastructure would be met with strikes across the region.
This exchange highlights the risks ahead. Trump is moving quickly in a direction that leaves fewer options. Without troops on the ground, the United States and Israel can only strike from the air, causing damage but not necessarily achieving the goal of total surrender. At the same time, such strikes could trigger wider retaliation, without reopening Hormuz.
The conflict's escalation has reduced not only strategic options but also potential paths toward resolution. With limited channels for negotiation, both Iran and the US face increasingly dire consequences, risking a cycle of destruction with severe repercussions for millions in the region.
